[Vol. 98:1351 clearly the standard operating system.4 Similarly, the Internet must adopt a standard for web browsing and searching, for email, and for web programming.5 In many cases, the competition for this standard will be fierce,6 because the winner likely will have intellectual property rights in the technology and hence reap a significant reward. Such in centives often are needed for the development of objectively good standards.7 Yet, as a consequence of granting intellectual property rights, a monopoly is created in a product that Internet users need.8 Once an Internet technology becomes a standard, how can the owner of the corresponding copyright be prevented from extracting monop oly rents and thereby negating the increase in consumer welfare that the standard created?9
It is an understatement to say that the Internet has become an im portant communications and commercial network. 12 See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cy berspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management, " 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 543 (1998) (noting that network effects are particularly salient in computer applications and interfaces where "[c]onsumers benefit from the ability to share files and migrate them between platforms, and from decreased retraining costs as applications and interfaces become standardized," which describes many of the at tributes of the Internet); Lemley, supra note 1, at 1045 (arguing that the Internet is clearly one case in which network effects do have a role to play).
13. See Maher, supra note 1, 'll 4.
14. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1047-49. A third factor, in addition to network effects and compatibility, also causes standardization: resource commitment (or path dependence), which is defined as the user's learning of a program's features and storage of data readable by that program, such as bookmarks. See id. at 1050-51. [Vol. 98:1351 one language that consumers can run on any platfonn15 that is "Java compatible."16 This "write once, run anywhere" advantage is espe cially important on the World Wide Web, where host websites need to upload programs to users' computers in order to allow them to inter face with the host's computer to, for example, make airline reserva tions on-line.17 Both ease of use and cost-saving factors are implicated in the ability to upload universal programs to such users, because users need not even be aware of the transmission of the program to their computers, nor worry about whether or not their platforms are com patible with a given website.18
Sun's vision has serious implications for the vitality of Windows' virtual network, because with such compatibility, the network effects that indirectly benefit Microsoft likely would vanish or at least dimin ish significantly.19 Although users would still need some platform, the benefit of having the same platform as other network users would de crease dramatically.
To accomplish its goal of cross-platform compatibility, Sun needed to incorporate its Java technology into each of the major platforms by licensing to them its copyrights and trademarks in Java.20 Sun and 16. In some cases, such as causing a scanner to operate, this is not completely true, but the advantage is still present because the job of rewriting the code for other platforms is proportionately easier since only the platform-specific code need be changed. 19. See supra note 11 for a definition of virtual network. Microsoft benefits from the network effect that its monopoly standard provides, because a consumer's choice is influ enced by the fact that, if she either buys a computer that cannot run Windows or chooses not to purchase Windows for a computer that could run it, she will not be able to use as many software applications, and may have some trouble exchanging information with users of Windows machines. Cross-platform compatibility would remove this incentive to buy Win dows and force Microsoft to compete for market share and sales based solely upon the rela tive merits of its operating system. 20. Although the copyrightability of the Java language itself may be debatable, see infra note 55, Sun would have copyright protection in the code for its technology. Computer As soc. Int'I, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 {2d Cir. 1992) (" [I] t is now well settled that the literal elements of computer programs, i.e., their source and object codes, are the subject of copyright protection.").
Microsoft entered into a license agreement in which Microsoft prom ised that if it made any changes to Java technology to make it Windows-specific, Microsoft would include pure Java options as well -options that would keep Java cross-platform compatible.21 Further, Microsoft's Java implementations would need to pass Sun's compati bility tests.22 Unsurprisingly, a dispute between Sun and Microsoft de veloped. Microsoft did make changes that inhibited compatibility and caused Microsoft's Java products to fail Sun's compatibility tests.23 Sun sued Microsoft and successfully obtained two preliminary injunc tions; both are in force until the products pass Sun's compatibility tests.24 It appears likely that Sun will win summ ary judgment on these claims as well.25 The dispute is important because it illuminates poten tial monopoly problems in this arena while serving as an example of the judicial enforcement of intellectual property rights in a standard, thereby maintaining the standard's integrity.
While Java presumably has copyright protection,26 this conclusion is not indisputable. Two commentators have noted that to "the extent Infringement Claim (visited Jan. 6, 2000) <http://java.sun.com/lawsuit/052499copyright. html>. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the copyright preliminary injunction be cause the district court failed to find, as a matter of law, that the claim was one that was enti tled to the presumption of irreparable harm, although it agreed with the district court that Sun was likely to prevail on the merits. Sun's assertion of intellectual property rights might preserve the integ rity of a cross-platform standard that might otherwise be fragmented, those rights are presently aligned with broader social welfare inter ests. "27 Thus, Sun's assertion of its copyright and trademark rights in the standard in this case is unlikely to raise antitrust or anticompetitive concems,28 because few will worry about Microsoft's unequal bar gaining power or susceptibility to the control of a monopolist.29 Yet, there are two reasons to pause for concern. First, this decision will have precedential power in other situations more likely to raise anti competitive issues, especially if the exercise of Sun's rights exceeds the scope of maintaining compatibility -if it were, for example, to try to control price, development, and access once Java is adopted. Further, Java, in concert with a web browser like Netscape Navigator, has the potential simply to replace Windows as the market standard for a plat form, substituting monopolist for monopolist. whether the public can ensure that Sun does not close the standard or try to extract monopoly licensing fees once Java is so adopted.33
Some argue that giving intellectual property rights to standards creates a monopoly problem and a consequential risk of diminution of social welfare and utility.34 The concern is that standard holders are able to extract monopoly rents in excess of a normal intellectual prop erty reward, an occurrence that decreases social welfare.35 But others counter that there are cases like Java, where such concerns are moot because Sun is presently using its copyright and trademark rights to develop, enhance, and maintain an open standard.36 This is important because one might want to treat the monopolist of an open standard with more leniency when it is not extracting monopoly rents, but rather is using its monopoly in procompetitive ways. The incentive based justifications for intellectual property protection need to be bal anced against the public interest and consumer welfare justifications.37
This Note suggests how standardization competition can proceed so as to tame the resulting monopolist, illustrating the debate by con sidering Java and the dispute involving Microsoft. This Note begins with the premise that although standards need intellectual property protection while competing to become the standard, limits should be imposed upon those rights once the standard is adopted in order to prevent monopolistic behavior. In Part I, this Note discusses the two traditional limits that have been applied to such standards in the past -limiting the scope of copyright protection and antitrust remedies - of creator protection and consumer protection in the intellectual property law). Second, it is the efficient functioning of a market (for example, the absence of monopoly rent extraction and healthy competition providing a competitive price). Third, it is the interest in techno logical improvement: the better the technology is in a standard, the more valuable it should be to consumers. Fourth, it is the consumers' realization of the benefits of network effects. Fifth (which may be a part of the first), it is the reservation of a public right implicit in the grant of a "limited right," i.e., the uncompensated positive externalities or "ancillary social benefits" that arise from publication of creative works. Cohen, supra note 12, at 547-48 (outlining the ancillary social benefits that are derived from creative works).
[Vol. 98:1351 and concludes that the latter is too slow and limited in its effective ness, while the former too drastic, especially in the case of Java. In Part II, this Note advocates taking a "middle ground" approach to limiting enforcement of intellectual property rights in standards through the use of the copyright misuse doctrine. Finally, Part III proposes a "modified copyleft"38 to provide added assurance that in tellectual property owners in standards will be held to their promise to mitigate, with an open standard, the dangers of enforcing intellectual property rights, providing another middle ground approach to the ex treme options outlined in Part I. This Note concludes that the combi nation of the copyright misuse defense and a modified copyleft con tract would prevent standard holders from turning around and locking up the standard, once adopted, with their intellectual property rights.
I. LIMITING COPYRIGHT: EVALUATING TRADITIONAL

PARADIGMS
This Part analyzes the traditional limitations that have been ap plied to the enforcement of intellectual property rights in standards. Section I.A examines the use of the idea/expression doctrine, an ap proach some courts have used to define the scope of copyright nar rowly so as to deny protection. It concludes that the results thus ob tained are too severe, because they deny the copyright holder the ability to reap the full reward intended in the grant of copyright pro tection. Section I.B analyzes the use of antitrust actions and concludes that they are often too slow and ineffective to prevent damage to con sumer welfare from the anticompetitive exercise of monopoly power.
A. Delimiting the Scope of Copyright
One way of mitigating the problem of intellectual property rights in a standard is to deny intellectual property protection to methods of operation as did the First Circuit in Lotus v. Borland. 39 Yet, this Sec-38. A "copyleft" describes a license agreement under which a copyrighted work is dis· tributed and which requires that the user must agree not to assert copyright to protect any improvements or changes he makes, must distribute those changes, if at all, subject to the same license terms, and must make all source code for those changes publicly available. The term "copyleft" was coined and explained by Richard Stallman at the GNU project's web· site. Lotus 1-2-3 menu co=and hierarchy is an uncopyrightable "method of operation"), affd tion concludes that the result reached by the Lotus court, effectively deeming the standard an idea for which copyright protection is un available, is problematic because companies might not invest the time required to develop standards if they will not be adequately rewarded financially.40 In the case of Java, denying copyright protection would be too harsh because Sun would be unable to protect compatibility, and consumers would not receive the benefits of cross-platform com patibility that Java offers.41
See
Lotus v. Borland involved the literal copying of the menu com mand hierarchy for the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program by a rival spreadsheet developer, Borland. Borland felt it necessary to copy this hierarchy because it had become the industry standard due to Lotus's dominance in the field.42 In order to accommodate Lotus 1-2-3 users' path dependence,43 Borland had to make user-written macros44 for Lotus 1-2-3 interoperable with Borland's spreadsheet (Quattro Pro). It had to be able to read users' macro instructions according to the Lotus menu command hierarchy, thus necessitating a literal copy of the hierarchy in Quattro's code. 45 The court held that the Lotus 1-2-3 menu structure was an uncopyrightable "method of operation" under section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, and thus Borland had not inby an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); cf. Lemley F.3d at 810. A literal copy was necessary because the macros were written by reference to the first letter of the name of each menu or submenu in 1-2-3 (for example, F for "File"), requiring Quattro Pro to include the 1-2-3 menu and submenu names and structure (the "menu command hierarchy") within its code.
[Vol. 98:1351 fringed Lotus's copyright.46 In other words, the court called Lotus's menu hierarchy an "idea" rather than an "expression."47 While this result allowed Borland to compete effectively with the standard holder, the ramifications were severe. The court's conclusion allows any competitor to use Lotus's hierarchy, regardless of whether the competitor offers a better product, a result that is diffi cult to jus tify.48 To deny copyright protection to 1-2-3 because it "was so innova tive that it occupied the field and set a de facto industry standard" is, as an earlier case noted, to "have flipped copyright on its head,"49 be cause the explicit aim of copyright is to secure to authors the exclusive right to their writings exactly so they can reap the rewards of a popular work.50 In the case in which this argument was made, another soft ware developer's copying of Lotus 1-2-3 was "overwhelming and per vasive," especially in comparison to Borland's copying of only the menu hierarchy. Had the Lotus court's approach been used in the earlier case, the result would have been especially severe -the com petitor would have been allowed to pirate the Lotus 1-2-3 program features solely because of its standard status.51 This has led some crit ics to argue that copyright is no longer an appropriate doctrine to pro tect network features of computer software at all.
Because the 46. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815. It is important not to misunderstand the result here. The court did not deem the Lotus code, which is explicitly granted protection by § 117 of the Copyright Act, to be a "method of operation," but rather found the hierarchy or interface, which is the manifestation of the code, to be a "method of operation." See id. To analogize this to a literary work, the court would protect the written text (code), but not the resulting story (the interface).
47. Fundamental copyright principles dictate that copyright protects only the expression of an idea, not the idea itself, and this principle is reflected in § 102(b)'s list of uncopy rightable subject matter. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding that copyright protects more than just the literal text, but does not extend as far as protecting the ideas expressed therein; in this case it did not protect the "idea" of a story de picting the quarrel between a Jewish and Irish Father, the marriage of their children, the birth of grandchildren, and a reconciliation).
It could be stated alternatively that the idea "merged" with the expression as in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). The effect is the same either way -copyright protection fails. The court suggested that it might consider the "long prompts" (short phrases describing the menu choices) under the merger doctrine if the issue were before the court on appeal. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815-16 n.9.
48. Judge Boudin's concurrence would have adopted a diff erent approach: it would al low a privileged use where the competitor is not seeking to appropriate Lotus's advances but is seeking to aid interoperability (allowing consumers to switch between competing pro grams) and to prevent path dependence (see supra notes 14 and 44 for a definition). This approach, he said, "would not automatically protect Borland if it had simply copied the Lotus menu (using diff erent codes), contributed nothing of its own, and resold Lotus under the Borland label." Lotus, 49 F.3d at 821 (Boudin, J., concurrin g). This approach, however, has never been used explicitly by a court. Copyright Act explicitly protects computer programs, however, this argument must fail.52
Although one interpretation of what the Lotus court did appears at first blush to be procompetitive, it rests on a faulty premise. One view of the effect of Lotus is that it forced the competing standards to be interoperable, allowing consumers to switch back and forth between them, and permitting the better product to win the standard competi tion.53 This has the advantage of not stranding those customers who choose the losing standard, because their files, programs, or hardware would be compatible with the winnin g standard. This advantage re duces the tendency of consumers to choose the firm they believe will succeed, rather than the one that has the better, if diff erent, standard ("market tipping").54 Thus, the Lotus approach might offer one feasi ble way to address a case like Sun's, not explicitly fleshed out by commentators -disallowing Sun's intellectual property rights in the Java language itself.55 This approach would force Sun to compete with others over whose Java virtual machine, which runs Java programs, will become the standard.56 L. 41, 50-56 (1998) (asserting that even though the code could be a "method of opera tion" or "process," denying protection in this fashion would be contrary to congressional intent in providing copyright protection to computer software code).
53. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1060 n.64 (suggesting such an approach for standardiza tion competition); see also Sheremata, supra note 35, at 961.
54. See Sheremata, supra note 35, at 958-59 and 941 (discussing the ways in which stan dards can and do compete, the effect of market tipping, and the convincing evidence that DR-DOS, the competing product to MS-DOS, was a far superior product but did not be come the standard because of Microsoft's dominant market position). Market tipping that results in an inferior standard being chosen is not in the best interests of consumer welfare. . Sun does not, however, nec essarily claim rights to the language as such, but rather to the "technology" that implements the code like the Virtual Machine, Java Native Interface, JDK, and class libraries, as well as constant improvements and upgrades. See TLDA, supra note 21, § 2.l(a). Furthermore, it seems clear that the virtual machine itself would be copyrightable (and patentable), because it is just the type of computer program the Copyright Act was amended to protect. See supra note 52. The market-tipping effect, however, cannot be so easily avoidedthe competition for the adoption of a standard will simply drop down to the next level, and focus, in Sun's case, on whose virtual machine will become the standard.57 Even with interoperability, people will tend to use the product they think is likely to become the standard or the one with the most convenient distribution channels, such as a company like Microsoft that is dominant in other areas.58 This may be just what happened to 1-2-3 after the Lotus case -Lotus's inability to enforce a copyright in its interface played a part in its demise as the market leader for spreadsheets and in the ascendance of Microsoft Excel.59 The end result is merely a transfer of monopolies. This does little to resolve the substantive monopoly and incentive problems; the winner of the new competition will still have a monopoly in a stan dard, and the original standard holder still forfeits its entitlement to a copyright reward. Further, the Lotus-type interoperability mandate would not permit Sun, for example, to maintain the cross-platform compatibility features, the very benefit that the standard brings in the ten referred to as a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) parses the Java code and "translates" it to the computer chip's specific code. The JVM is not usually a piece of hardware like the chip -hence it is a "virtual" machine -but rather software that runs "on top or• the operating system, bypassing the necessity of writing several versions of a program, each with chip specific code. The JVM must produce these individual computer chip instructions, so each JVM is specific to the type of computer chip.
57. This is just what has happened with email, for example. The standard is established and non-proprietary, which has the same effect as making the standard interoperable, but it can be argued that the "next level" for which there is now fierce competition is "instant mes saging," where compatibility is seen as antithetical to capturing an installed base. See Stein, supra note 6. At one point Lemley notes that such a JVM competition may result from in dependent development of Java bytecodes with non-Java programming languages. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1052 n.36.
58. Both of these tendencies are illustrated in the "browser wars" between Microsoft and Netscape. That consumers would tend to use the product they believed to be the winner or likely winner was reflected in Microsoft's belief that development of a superior product in Internet Explorer and offering it for free would not be sufficient to dislodge Netscape from its market-leading position. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 37 (D.D.C. 1999). That people tend to use a product with convenient distribution channels is illustrated by Microsoft's attempt to restrict Netscape's access to such channels in order to gain market share for Internet Explorer. Id. at 38.
59. The decision certainly prevented Lotus from reaping the rewards of establishing the industry standard. It may be that cognizant of this risk, Lotus was unwillin g or unmotivated to develop a better interface, as did Microsoft in Excel. If for no other reason, the result is severe because Lotus lost the right to be rewarded for its "writings" into which it had poured large sums of money and time in development It is doubtful that Lotus would have invested the resources into such development if it would not have been able to protect the product at all, in other words, to recoup its investment See Friedman, supra note 40, at 1122. To be fair, the court did not deny protection to all of 1-2-3, just to the menu hierarchy, but it essen tially enabled Borland to copy that which had become one of 1-2-3's most useful features: the way in which 1-2-3 made simple the writing and executing of macros.
first place, because it could not prevent licensees like Microsoft from developing incompatible versions of Java technology.60
One commentator has suggested, along the lines of Lotus, that to foster competition and innovation by limiting the intellectual property rights of the standard holder, copyright law ought to adopt the patent idea of "blocking" to protect improvements.61 The idea of blocking patents is that the improver can, by securing a patent, block the origi nal patent holder from making that improvement herself. The im prover, however, cannot use the improvement because it is based upon a previously granted patent -thus, both parties are blocked from using the improvement, hopefully an incentive to negotiation.62 Such an approach, it is argued, would protect these improvers by pro viding the protection for improvement that copyright traditionally de nies authors of unauthorized derivative works and would further the incentives that copyright is meant to encourage: progress, innovation, and protection of new expression.63 This approach would accomplish what the Lotus court did, allowing Borland to improve upon 1-2-3, but would arguably not be as drastic, because it would only have pre vented Lotus from capitalizing on Borland's improvement, and would not have diminished the protection Lotus had for 1-2-3.
This proposition, however, is not much better than Lotus because it would require either a statutory change or the overruling of many precedents.64 Unless Congress changed the basic tenets of copyright 60. In order to maintain the utility of the network effect (cross-compatibility), Sun would have to have some control over the use of the Java "network," but it need not control access to the specifications which are now public, nor control who can write programs in Java, much like Microsoft can for Windows. The recent antitrust litigation by the Depart ment of Justice has focused on this control. The estimate of Windows' market share is usu ally 90%. United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 & 98-1233, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14231, at *11 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998). Trademark rights in JAVA enable Sun to enforce compatibility requirements -ensuring that programs written in Java will run on any plat form -because if claims of compatibility were untrue, Sun could enjoin the competitors under the Lanham Act This point mitigates against the preservation of copyright protection (it does not need copyright to protect compatibility), but the fact that no one need license the trademark to market a product as compatible (if it is) favors maintaining copyright pro tection to preserve the incentive to innovate. Thus, both trademark and copyright protec tion are necessary. Irrespective of the standard status of Java, there is no compelling reason to restrict trademark rights in a standard where the company has invested in building the brand name. Trademark law provides a remedy if the mark unduly inhibits competition be cause of its "monopoly" status: genericide, which is beyond the scope of this Note. law, this approach would not be helpful, because copyright law, unlike patent law, allows for independent creation.65 Thus, suppose a Sun competitor improves upon Java and seeks protection under this ap proach. She could only do so if Sun was unable to independently cre ate this improvement, because once Sun learned of the idea, it could create its own exp ression of this idea without violating her blocking copyright.66 Furthermore, Sun's access to her idea would not satisfy the access requirement for infringement, because the idea is not copy rightable.67 She would only be protected from Sun's literal copying of her code. Moreover, given the pace at which companies such as Sun innovate, it is unlikely that it would need her code. Thus, neither the approach adopted in Lotus, nor any approach derived therefrom, is capable of adequately addressing the problems presented by internet standardization.
B. Antitrust Enforcement
Antitrust enforcement presents a possible approach to the problem of Internet standardization, as it is the traditional response to concerns regarding a monopolist.68 This Section acknowledges that there are some limited circumstances where antitrust enforcement can be useful, often after a standard is adopted. But this Section argues that, in most cases, antitrust is too slow and its remedies too blunt to be an effective tool for remedying the monopoly and incentive problems inherent in internet standardization cases such as the Java dispute.
(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming summ ary judgement for plaintiff where defendant purchased cop ies of book, cut out pictures, glued them with a border to tiles, and sold them).
65. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) ("If evidence of access is absent, the similarities must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that the plaintiff and defen· dant independently arrived at the same result.").
66. See supra note 47.
67. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, L.) ("defendants were entitled to use ... even the plaintiffs' contribution itself, if they drew from it only the more general patterns; that is, if they kept clear of its 'expression.' ").
68. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1-7 (1994), prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade, like price fixing, under Section 1 but this Section does not play a significant role in standardization any more than it does in any other industry. Section 2's prohibitions on mo nopolization and attempts to monopolize are the source of antitrust power in the standardi zation case; by definition, a standard with copyright protection has a monopoly. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Of course, the granting of intellectual property rights by Congress carries with it an exemption from the antitrust laws; that is, a copyright holder is not guilty of attempting to monopolize just because she registers her copyrighted work. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 12-27 (1994), provides jurisdiction to the Federal Trade Commis sion (FTC) under Section 18 to approve mergers and acquisitions where "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.'' One way that antitrust can protect post-adoption69 standard com petition is that the government can compel licensing or interoperabil ity through antitrust decrees or as a condition for the approval of mergers.70 But as a tool for balancing the competing interests, anti trust is limited, because it requires that the standard holder's activities be proscribed by antitrust law or that they fall under the purview of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). An interesting example is the compulsory license imposed upon West Publishing for its star pagination system, which a court had determined was copyrightable, as a condition for approval of its purchase by Thompson.71 In many ways, West's pagination system is a standard in the legal community that resembles a network and has many of the same characteristic network effects. There is an added value to the network in being able to use one standard citation for a case because it enables quick and ac curate identification of the authority, and the more that users adopt this standard, the more valuable and efficient it becomes.72 The gov ernment evidently recognized this anticompetitive concern and made the standard, in effect, interoperable, meaning that anyone could li cense it on a reasonable basis,73 thereby forcing West to compete in other areas. This requirement prevents West from being able to lev erage its monopoly over the standard into market share in the bur geoning electronic database market.74 In such cases, there could 69. This Note will differentiate between the competition among various possible stan dards before the "market" settles on one from the competition between the standard holder and those competitors who seek to oust the standard by referring to the former as pre adoption competition and the latter as post-adoption competition. hardly be a better solution, because there is no danger of inadvertently diminishing the scope of copyright protection for works that are not the subject of network effects, because there is no precedent estab lished.75 Nor would one worry about the anticompetitive effects in these cases, because the copyright owner has agreed to license the work while maintaining its copyright.76 But again, the limited circum stances under which this type of remedy can be used -in mergers and settlement decrees -reduce its effectiveness. In the case of Java, such remedies would be of limited use because Sun has neither exhib ited anticompetitive behavior nor attempted any large scale mergers, but that proves the larger point that the remedies can be effective in important situations.
Antitrust enforcement can sometimes help during the pre adoption standards competition as well. Some commentators argue that antitrust enforcement should be used to police anticompetitive conduct during the period of competition for the adoption of the stan dard to ensure that the best standard is adopted, instead of the stan dard of the firm with the most leveraging power.77 Surely Sun's ac tions during the time it is competing to have Java adopted as the standard should be scrutinized for anticompetitive conduct under the antitrust laws, just as any firm's would be. And when it enters into agreements such as the AOL/Netscape merger, an agreement to pur chase various assets from Netscape and to provide certain services to the new AOL/Netscape combination,78 the FTC has the ability to bal ance consumer welfare interests with those of Sun in ways similar to those employed in the West purchase mentioned above.79 Such ac tions have little built-in disincentive for innovation and pose little the market share garnered by West would have been limited to those situations where pin point cites are required, which includes, at the very least, all academic legal writing, although arguably not necessary for the practitioner who may or may not conform to the Bluebook. Even in the latter case, however, such practitioners might choose to use Westlaw (West's online database) exclusively just because of the times when it is more convenient to cite to a West page.
See
Lemley & McGowan, supra note 11, at 540 (identifying "the problem the First Circuit confronted in the Lotus case: how to craft an intellectual property rule that will en hance social welfare in network effects cases without inflicting too much damage on the fun. damental tenets of intellectual property law in the majority of cases where network effects do not play a role."). Tate, the producer of the "dBase" standard: Borland was required to forego "initiating or making any claim or counterclaim that asserts claims of copyright infringement in the com mand names, menu items, menu command hierarchies, command languages, programming languages and file structures used in and recognized by Ashton-Tate's dBase family of prod ucts ..•. "). 
80. Although such restrictions may in truth reduce the incentive to innovate because the possibility of excessive monopolistic rewards is reduced, the most important incentivethat for which the Constitution provides a copyright -remains intact. [Vol. 98:1351 AT&T, or Microsoft, even significantly shorter times would still be too lengthy, especially in the fast-changing world of technology. 88 Second, antitrust remedies have a "blunt hand." Specifically, they can be unduly harsh, and, as a threat, they can inhibit innovation.89 In the absence of anticompetitive behavior to enj oin, or acquisitions that require the FTC's approval, the most likely remedy a court would or der in an antitrust case is a restructuring of the company.90 In such situations, "antitrust is a fairly blunt instrument,"91 because forcing di vestiture of the standard or prohibiting a firm from competing in the market does little to remedy the monopoly status of the standard. In stead, it merely changes the owner, and it is still severe and poses a veritable threat. In a case like Java, such structural relief cannot com pel the maintenance of its open specifications.92 Spinning off the Java standard into the hands of a new company does little to remedy the consumer welfare concerns that accompany a closed standard. Moreover, absent some method of guaranteeing that the standard will 88. The median total length from complaint to termination of private antitrust cases is 17 months. See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Anti trust Litigation, 14 GEO. L.J. 1001 , 1009 (1986). Even the government's trial against Micro soft, which has received praise for its brevity, still took eight months from the beginnin g of testimony to the release of the findings of fact See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). The time frame for developing a standard varies with the tech nology and market factors, but it would seem that a one to three year range is typical. See Charles W. L. Hill , Establishing a Standard: Competitive Strategy and Te chnological Stan dards in Winner-take-all Industries, ACAD. OF MGMT. EXECUTIVE 7, May 1997 at 7, 12 (cit ing the rapid industry acceptance of a standard for CD technology once Sony and Philips agreed on a standard -over 30 companies agreed to license the technology within 2 years, and a technological development time of 3 years for a competing CT scanner); Julie Pitta, Fo rm at Wa rs, FORBES, July 7, 1997, at 266 (detailing the competition between Adobe Systems' PostScript document format and Xerox's rival format standard, noting that after two years, a standards committee approved a standard that was a combination of the two formats, by which time PostScript had been adopted by the market, so that the committee's standard was worthless). remain open, the new owner cannot be prevented from acting just as its predecessor did. Again, the Internet is naturally driven toward standardization. Despite the fact that the winner of the standard competition receives too great a windfall upon adoption,93 standards are efficient and necessary for the operation of the Intemet.94 The threat of antitrust action upon the firm after the technology is adopted as a standard is, if effective, also counterproductive because it could deter the development of such standards. 95 Third, antitrust cannot address anticompetitive licensing provisions that fall short of Sherman Act violations.96 In a case like Sun's, this shortcoming is particularly conspicuous. Sun is not yet a monopolist, because Java has arguably not yet been adopted as a standard.97 In addition, there is no evidence that Sun has engaged in anticompetitive or monopolistic conduct that might bring it under Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act.98 The Microsoft antitrust case in progress was only initiated once Netscape was injured, by which time AOL had moved in to acquire it.99 Thus the antitrust action, at least insofar as it is seeking to ensure fair competition in the browser market, may be moot. Antitrust law would allow Sun, with impunity, to champion Java as an open standard in order to push for its adoption and then close the standard once adopted.
See Lemley
Fourth, some antitrust remedies threaten to severely diminish the incentive structure in place to promote "the useful arts."100 The gov ernment's antitrust action against Microsoft has led at least one com mentator to argue that the essential facilities doctrine, which forces the monopolist to allow competitors to use its facilities, is an appropri ate remedy for monopoly leveraging of electronic networks by en trenched monopolists holding proprietary rights to standards, like 93. The reward is at least a greater incentive for innovation than is needed. See Farrell & Katz, supra note 11, at 638 (stating that the winner of a standards competition may be over rewarded); Lemley, supra note 1, at 1060 n.64. Yet the argument that it would not punish Microsoft is unpersua sive. Requiring Microsoft to open its code to the world is something that would deter further innovation on its part.103 Although such a remedy would indeed help other software manufacturers, it does not provide sufficient incentive for the development of standards, a proc ess which requires enormous resources which only will be invested if commensurate rewards can be expected.104 If the next standard holder must worry that its proprietary code will become an essential facility, the information economy may end up mired in a technological stand still because firms will have insufficient incentive to invest the neces sary resources to develop standards.
See
On the other hand, if a firm gets to the point where its standard is important enough to become an essential facility, it may be willing to lose control over it because it has recouped its costs and profited im mensely. This argument is based upon the premise that all standards reward their creators relatively quickly, which may not always be true. It also does not address the concern that the owner of the standard would have far less incentive to offer improvements or upgrades to its standard. If Microsoft were required to treat Windows as an essential facility, two problems would emerge. First, once the next version of Windows is released, the "facility" would be different, and the solu tion moot. Second, if all successive versions of Windows were to be 102. Piraino, supra note 101, at 7.
103. Cf. Farrell & Katz, supra note 11, at 648 (discussing the potential effects of antitrust on innovation, concluding: "Public policy regarding the mandatory sharing of an interface must balance adverse effects on the incentive to improve the interface against the positive competitive effects from sharing it once it has been created. By and large, when the creation of an interface involves large costs and great ingenuity, the adverse innovation incentive ef fects are likely to be relatively strong.").
104. See Hill , supra note 88, at 15 (discussing the "hundreds of millions of dollars" that Philips has spent on trying to develop its Digital Compact Cassette technology); Karjala, su· pra note 52, at 50. For examples of software development costs, see Dickerman Assocs., Inc. considered essential facilities, it is unlikely that Microsoft would con tinue to invest the same amount of time and resources into its devel opment.
Antitrust, then, is not often capable of providing ex post protection from a standard's intellectual property rights monopoly because of its tendency toward slowness and severity, frequent powerlessness, and potential to inhibit innovation and creativity. Thus, two of the most commonly suggested and implemented solutions, discussed in this Part, for the remedy of monopoly control over a standard fail to achieve an effective balance between the protection of producer in centives and of consumer welfare interests in a competitive market place. Li miting the scope of copyright, as did the Lotus court, is too dangerous to innovation, and antitrust's hand is too slow and too blunt to be effective.
II. THE COPYRIGHT MISUSE DEFENSE
There is a middle ground between the two approaches outlined in Part I that catches anticompetitive behavior that antitrust dqes not and that avoids the problems inherent in a Lotus-type approach. This approach is the copyright misuse defense, and it can be invoked in con tract or infringement actions.105 It achieves an appropriate balance be tween consumer welfare needs and the maintenance of an adequate incentive structure for innovators, and it also addresses anticompeti tive licensing provisions.106 Because copyright misuse does not require actions that would. otherwise be a violation of the antitrust laws, its in vocation may be more effective.107 This Part explores the brief history of copyright misuse and its potential application in Internet standardi zation cases. It concludes that copyright misuse indeed may be helpful in addressing some of the problems outlined so far in this Note. By providing a defense to those sued by a copyright owner like Sun, for example, copyright misuse can keep such standard holders from clos ing their standards and enforcing their rights through infringement ac tions. Yet, this Part will also show that the defense is somewhat new and the scope of its application unclear, so there is still a need for a clearer ceiling to standard holders' rights.108 105. Lasercomb, decided in 1990, is regarded as the first case to seriously apply this middle ground. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
106. See, e.g., Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 1999) (requiring users of its copyrighted software to use its hardware as well); Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978 (discussing the ninety-nine year prohibition on the licensee's development of sinillar software).
107. See supra Section I.B.
108. See infra Part III .
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The copyright misuse defense was first established in Lasercomb v. Reynolds,1(Y) which allowed the defense to an infringement action if the copyright was being "used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright."110 In that case, the copyright holder attempted to prevent its licensees, through contract provisions, from independently innovating a competing product for ninety-nine years.111 The licensee in the case actually had never signed the con tract, but the court held that the defense was not limited to those sub ject to such anticompetitive contract provisions.112
The application of copyright misuse in Lasercomb has much 112 See id. at 977. It did, however, base its finding of misuse upon such contract provi sions -it just allowed any would-be infringer to rely on the misuse defense regardless of whether it was under such a contract The court explicitly rejected the notion that the charge had to rise to the level of an antitrust violation. See id. at 978. 114. DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996) (in terlocutory appeal of narrow preliminary injunction affirm ed because of likelihood of copy right misuse by plaintiff/ appellant), modified sub nom. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc._ 166 F.3d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that DSC (now Alcatel) was guilty of copy right misuse).
115. See Alcatel, 166 F.3d at 777. The only factual problem with this case is that DGI made copies of DSC's software and removed them from a third-party licensee's premises. Thus "DGI duped [the licensee] into breaching its own contract with DSC" and provided the basis for the judgment against it for misappropriation of trade secrets. Alcatel, 166 F.3d at 785. Although the court found that the copyright law preempted the state unfair competi tion claim, it did not address the preemption of the trade secrets claim. See id. If the court purposefully avoided the issue, it would be understandable, because it is not an easy argu-finding of misuse on the fact that DSC tried to extend its copyright to protect its unpatented hardware, something that the Copyright Act does not protect.116 At the same time, the court affirm ed the dismissal of DGI's antitrust counterclaims, reaffirmin g that conduct which con stitutes misuse need not rise to the level of an antitrust violation.117
Copyright misuse provides yet another advantage. Specifically, courts can apply it with discretion, tailoring it to prevent the "lock up" of a network standard and to provide a ceiling to the level of copyright protection available in cases where there is anticompetitive conduct. At the same time, courts may refuse to apply it in situations where in tellectual property rights and social welfare interests are aligned.118 It is far better for courts to have significant discretion than to stamp out innovation with blunt antitrust remedies or harsh limitations on intel lectual property rights.119
In order to check such discretion, some commentators advocate an antitrust standard for misuse, meaning that only separate antitrust Violations would rise to the level of copyright misuse.120 Such a stan dard would, it is argued, avoid "inflicting too much damage on the fundamental tenets of intellectual property law in the maj ority of cases where network effects do not play a role" because the rule of reason methodology in antitrust will allow the court to consider procompeti tive justifications for and the anticompetitive effects of restraints on ment to say that copyright misuse should trump misappropriation of trade secrets claims. Generally, such claims survive preemption by copyright, and addressing this issue might re quire developing a different standard for "misuse preemption," but this issue is beyond the scope of this Note. The applicability of the misuse defense would have saved DGI from li ability in this case were it not for its deception. This is evidenced by the Fifth Circuit's ap proval of the initial injunction, which only prevented DGI from removing copies of DSC's software from the premises of the licensee and explicitly allowed copying incidental to test ing the cards. See DSC, 81 F .3d at 599-600. 119. See supra Section I.B for a discussion of the effects of (inflexible) antitrust applica tion on the incentive structure and innovation. Cf. Farrell and Katz, supra note 11 (con cluding that "[p]ublic policy ... must balance adverse effects on the incentive to improve the interface against the positive competitive effects from sharing it once it has been created.") (emphasis added). Implicit in such an ability to balance is sufficient discretion in fashioning remedies.
120. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 11, at 540. The authors point to the Lotus case as an example of potential damage to the "fundamental tenets of intellectual property," but fail to explain how the application of misuse would fix this problem. Id.; see also Roger Arar, Redefining Copyright Misuse, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1310-11 (1981) ("[C]ourts applying a misuse defense can do no better than to look to substantive antitrust princi ples .... ").
[Vol. 98:1351 trade.121 Yet, this Note argues that courts can use a rule of reason bal ancing approach without requiring an antitrust violation. Such a bal ancing approach is implicit in the Lasercomb language defining misuse as occurring when "copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright."122 To the ex tent that procompetitive justifications for an extension of the rights provided by copyright violate such public policy, no problem exists, because any extension of rights beyond those granted in copyright should be authorized by Congress, not by the courts.123 In fact, allow ing courts to consider such procompetitive justifications would itself inflict too much damage on the fundamental tenets of the constitu tional separation of powers.124 Furthermore, if courts use antitrust as a barometer, they will miss a lot of behavior that decreases social wel fare, such as the anticompetitive licensing provisions in Lasercomb or
DSC.125
Moreover, misuse is more narrowly tailored than either the ap proach the Lotus court used or antitrust.126 By not invalidating the copyright, as the Lotus court did, the misuse defense does less damage to the "fundamental tenets of intellectual property law."127 Once the owner has "purged itself of the misuse," it can again assert its rights.128
121. For an explication of the "Rule of Reason," see, for example, Chicago Bd. Of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (writing that "the true test of legality is whether the restraint [of trade] imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 {1911) (announcing Rule of Reason). It seems possible that courts might achieve a just result short of antitrust-level violations by application of the defense. For example, the court that found West's star pagination copyrightable could have used the copyright misuse defense as a more palatable way to allow Lexis to use the pagination system, rather than invalidating West's copyright, had it been suggested.129 The court could have found that West's attempt to extend its copyright to the pagination was misuse, and thus a defense to the infringement action it brought against Lexis. In this way, the court could have avoided inflicting too much damage to the intellectual property regime because it would not have had to expand the protection of copyright to cover what was arguably not ex pression, nor would it have had to invalidate the copyright entirely. 130 Some commentators argue that because reverse engineering -as certaining the process by which some program, device, or technology was created by starting with the finished product and working "in re verse" -is available, the copyright misuse defense need not often be applied.131 There are significant problems with reverse engineering in an open standard case, though. For one, the time it takes to reverse engineer may amount to an insurmountable entry barrier.132 Further, the advantage of reverse engineering is not obvious, because most of the ideas that could be extracted with impunity already are open and available. If a reverse engineer wanted to distill the functionality from, for example, a Java Class Library -perhaps one that if used in a program would produce a dialog box with an "OK" button and a (1991) (finding that the "white pages" are not original enough to be copyrightable under the Constitution or the Copyright Act), after which West's copyright in its page numbers is cer tainly questionable. The Lotus court did the latter. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d at 815 (calling the standard an uncopyrightable "method of operation").
131. In the software context, this means starting with the object code (machine lan guage) and "decompiling" it to come up with the human-readable source code. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1519-27 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that reverse engi neering of a copyrighted computer program is fair use when it is the only way to gain access to ideas and fu nctional elements and there is a legitimate reason for so doing); see also Cohen, supra note 128. Professor Cohen's article deals with technological protections, one possible way that Sun could protect Java if it closed the standard. But the Digital Millen nium Copyright Act provides an exception for reverse engineering such protective devices.
[Vol. 98:1351 "Cancel" button -she could easily do so. But the specifications of that library are already freely available to her under Java's open stan dard. If she did reverse engineer the library, she only would be per mitted to use the ideas, not the expression of the code that enabled the functionality.133 Most of the work involved would be in expressing this idea, and her efforts would be futile.134
To be effective, the misuse defense must have a broad application. Users need a way to prevent a standard holder like Sun from estab lishing the standard, in part due to reliance on its promise of open specifications, and then closing the standard once it is adopted. It is worth noting that in Sun's case, should it close the standard, the opti mal remedy would require more than just reverse engineering. The goal would be to gain access to more than just functionality, but rather to all that was previously open, because it would have been partly on that basis that it was accepted as a standard. The copyright misuse de fense provides an avenue for securing this access because without the enforcement of its copyright, Sun would not be able to keep the speci fications closed.
The enforcement of Java's copyright, as in Sun's dispute with Mi crosoft, is aligned with social welfare interests because it has enabled Sun to maintain the compatibility of its product. Microsoft, however, has accused Sun of misuse in the lawsuit.135 This provides an example of the defense functioning perfectly, because nothing that Sun has done in the context of its dispute with Microsoft, nor any of the lan guage in its license agreement, warrants the application of copyright misuse.136 In considering the defense, the court must take Sun's mo tives into account.137 If Sun used its copyright to lock up access to a li censor who, like Microsoft, was taking actions that would destroy the 133. Again, the trade secrecy problem introduces interesting variations tQ the issue, be cause Sun might try to protect its newly closed standard with secrecy, but this is beyond the scope of this Note (as it was in Cohen's article, supra note 128).
134. The idea of producing a dialogue box is simple. Expressing this idea in code is where the work is involved.
135. Microsoft has accused Sun of misusing its copyrights in court filings pertaining to Sun's case against it. These accusations are evidently based upon Sun's proposed prelimi nary injunction orders, which Microsoft argues attempt to "restrict Microsoft ' cross-platform compatibility, the application of the misuse defense would have to fail. This is because Sun's actions would not be "viola tive of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright,"138 but rather in concordance with it, protecting the expression itself. The copyright misuse defense, then, presents a more moderate and reasonable approach to placing limits on the rights of Internet stan dard holders. The defense can be used in a fair and balanced manner in order to ensure that the holder of intellectual property rights does not extend her control beyond protecting her expression. Because its application does not require an antitrust violation, many of the con cerns outlined above regarding the use of antitrust are not problematic here. Moreover, it presents no danger of creating worrisome prece dent for future standard holders, as did the Lotus decision, and it also ensures that even the copyright holder found to have misused his copyright is not forever barred from protecting his expression if he rectifies the violations of public policy.
Yet although the copyright misuse defense can be helpful, it is on such uncertain legal ground that courts may be reluctant to apply it. Moreover, it is only a defense -it cannot compel a standard holder like Sun to keep its specifications open. Thus, in order to maintain the appropriate balance between incentives to innovate and consumer welfare, additional legal remedies are needed.
III . ANEQUITABLE REMEDY: CAN ESTOPPEL lMPLY A COPYLEFT?
One issue that critics have not adequately explored is whether courts could use the strong equity tradition in the field of intellectual property law and apply equitable estoppel. In a case like Sun's, where the adoption of a standard is based upon certain promises, implied or expressed, courts could estop the promissor from asserting its legal rights if it abrogates those promises. Part III of this Note proposes that if a standard holder does abrogate such promises, it should be es topped from asserting its intellectual property rights. In combination with the application of the copyright misuse defense, this remedy will protect innovation, the ideology of intellectual property law, and con sumer welfare.
A "copyleft" license provides that any user must agree not to as sert copyright to protect any improvements or changes he makes, must distribute any changes subj ect to the license, and must make publicly available the entire source code for those changes. The term was coined by Richard Stallman as a way of using "the softw�e hoarders' legal system" to protect the public from the copyright holders.139 141. Fundamental copyright principles dictate that an "author" can base her copyright on any works in the public domain, since they would not have the protection of copyright, and she can copyright her work so long as there is at least some noticeable difference that is not "merely trivial." See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-5 (2d Cir. 1951) ("All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the 'author' contributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recogniza bly 'his own.' ... A copyist's bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a variation unintentionally, the 'author' may adopt it as his and copyright it.''). None of this, of course, is true if the work being copied is copyrighted, because then copying is infringe ment Cf. supra notes 62-fJ7 and accompanying text.
142 See Heffan, supra note 38, at 1509-14. A shrink-wrap license is the license that ac companies the purchase of most software products, its name derived from the fact that agreement to its terms is presumed by the removal of the "shrink-wrap" around the software reasons. First, the license forbids the licensee from copyrighting any improvements she makes. This requirement is not needed to balance the interests outlined ab ove, and, in fact, is contrary to the need for appropriate incentives to develop and use standards; without copy right incentives to protect their programs, for example, Java develop ers might use another program or not develop at all.144 Second, copyleft traditionally binds the consumer and not the licensor. Thus, some modification to copyleft is necessary to fit the circumstances here.
Hence, one possible avenue through which equity could enforce promises made by standard holders like Sun is through a new type of implied contract, a modified copyleft. At least one commentator has viewed recent trends, such as the enforcement of shrink-wrap licenses, as being favorable enough to the intellectual property owner that he posits that consumers will need a consumer-protection law to counter act those advantages.145 If the courts will validate shrink-wrap licenses, which are essentially adhesion contracts, even where the customer's intent to be bound by the license is not clear, then they should coun terbalance such validation by incorporating into this contract any promises or manifestations made by the software producer. Effec tively, courts would be implying a copyleft contract in reverse: the producer would be obligated to keep the specifications open as a con dition of its standard being accepted by the consumers who rely on the producer's open-source manifestations. Conventional copyleft is con cerned with preventing consumers from destroying an open-source policy; a modified copyleft would make this obligation mutual. Al though many commentators have argued that shrink-wrap licenses should not be enforceable because there is a disparity of bargaining power between the consumer and software producer, such a modified copyleft license should still bind companies like Sun, who clearly have the power to influence the terms of the contract, because the bargaining-power disparity would be moot and the result of enforcing this type of contract would benefit, not harm, social welfare.146
Specifically in Sun's case, the company has made statements to its licensees, to the press, and to the International Organization for Stan dardization ("ISO") that it would always, at a minimum, fairly license 144. See Farrell & Katz, supra note 11 and supra Section I.B.
145. See Lemley, supra note 37, at 185-87. He also notes in passing the possibility of an inlplied covenant to keep the standard platform independent. See Lemley & McGowan, su pra note 27, at 771. 146. One of the arguments against enforcing such licenses is that they are adhesion con tracts, so the consumer has no choice but to agree to the terms if she needs the softwareshe has no power to bargain with the manufacturer. See David L. Hayes, Shrinkwrap Li cense Agreements: New Light on a Vexing Problem, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 653 (1993) (discussing the validity of shrink-wrap license agreements).
[Vol. 98:1351 its technology to anyone interested.147 Sun has stated that it will pro vide free copyright and patent licenses should Java be adopted as the ISO standard,148 but will retain its trademark rights in Java.149 Sun also promises to license its logo on a nondiscriminatory, fair basis to those who pass its compatibility tests.150 Moreover, Alan Baratz, President of Sun's Javasoft Business Unit, said:
[t]he process that Sun has been running, is runnin g, and will continue to keep running, is that open industry particip ative process. It will continue to yield open specifications for the APls, it will continue to be delivered with free rights to the intellectual property needed to implement against those specifications.151
The ISO, legal commentators, and industry representatives want the guarantee of an open standard that will not be closed if adopted, 152 and Sun has at least implied, and at most guaranteed them, that Java will remain open.153 [Vol. 98:1351 copyleft license. The license agreement together with the implied terms would differ in some respects from a copyleft, because a Sun li censee would be able to have some rights in its authorized derivative works.160 It is similar, though, in that Sun would be using its intellec tual property rights in the way that it has promised, ensuring compati bility and innovation, but not securing a monopoly over a standard. The essence of the copyleft license, that the software is to be distrib uted in such a way that open source can be maintained, would remain, as the now-public Java specifications and libraries would be immune to efforts by Sun or others to close them. In this case, Sun would be subject to the terms of an implied copyleft so that it could not convert that which was open into a closed standard. If it did, it would be sub ject to a breach of contract suit, perhaps with a specific-performance decree requiring release of the standard.
In order to maintain the benefits to consumer welfare that open standards provide, courts need to place some limits on the enforce ment of intellectual property rights. This Part has proposed that the intellectual property rights of standard holders should, by way of a modified copyleft contract, be circumscribed by the public promises they make during the standardization competition.161 In Sun's case, a modified copyleft contract would be implied because Sun has publicly championed Java's open-standard status in trying to gain its accep tance as a standard. The result would not risk damage to the tenets of copyright law, nor would it be unduly harsh. Sun and other such standard-holders would only be required to honor their pledges.
CONCLUSION
The traditional methods of addressing the concerns of enforcing intellectual property rights in standards by limiting the scope of copy right and antitrust actions are either too severe or too weak. The pre sumptive de facto standard status of Java, for example, has not yet ob viated the need for full intellectual property protection. Sun's dispute with Microsoft is clear evidence of this fact. There are many reasons to be concerned with the implications of granting intellectual property rights to the holder of a standard like Java, many of which have been discussed in this Note.
Sun, for one, appears to be on the way to overcoming what may have been the biggest obstacle to its adoption: the threat that the en trenched market leader, Microsoft, would tip the standard to its own 160. See TLDA, supra note 21, at § 2.10b.
161. It is true that such a standard would involve a degree of uncertainty, just as the copyright misuse defense gives courts wide discretion. As argued at supra text accompany ing note 119, however, such discretion is preferable to the dangers to innovation and con sumer welfare that other options pose.
proprietary product, either an incompatible version of Java or its own ActiveX language. It may soon be that Sun, like other standard hold ers, will be significantly more powerful, capable of leveraging its stan dard into other markets, trying to extend its copyright to protect un protectable technology, or failing to comply with its previous promises. Two other recent developments might affect this situation even more. First, the resolution of the Microsoft antitrust case will likely result in a curtailing of its leveraging power, which could have implications for all competitors for Internet standards. Second, the purchase of Netscape by AOL and Sun may provide further control over the network and opportunity for Sun to expand its market.
A combination of the copyright misuse doctrine and a modified copyleft, if correctly tailored by courts, can adeptly balance the com peting consumer welfare and incentive-to-innovate concerns. The un questioning acceptance of Java's copyright is, at present, unproblem atic. The power of establishing a precedent in this matter, however, may be quite threatening. Through the discussion of antitrust, copy right protection, misuse, and modified copyleft, perhaps the courts and commentators will recognize that standard competitors should be given just enough control over the standard to protect it from such threats to its utility. It need not have the full range of rights tradition ally granted the owner of intellectual property. The limitations this Note has outlined will help prevent the misalignment of intellectual property rights with broader social interests.
